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Abstract 
 
To date studies assessing the democratizing effects of elections have produced mixed results.  
While findings suggest that successive uninterrupted election cycles in a global sample (Teorell 
and Hadenius 2009) and within sub-Saharan Africa (Lindberg 2006, 2009) have a robust positive 
impact on democratization, tests in other regions have been less encouraging.  In particular, 
negative empirical findings in Latin America (McCoy and Hartlyn 2009) and Postcommunist 
Europe (Kaya and Bernhard 2013) call into question whether the democratizing effect of 
elections is isolated to the sub-Saharan region.  In addition, the hypothesis has been subject to 
conceptual criticism (Lust-Okar 2009).  This paper poses a comprehensive and global set of tests 
on the democratizing effect of elections, assessing the scope of the argument both geographically 
and temporally.  We test whether elections have a democratizing effect in specific regions, in 
specific time periods, and globally.  In particular we assess whether the effects are largely 
confined to Africa, during the third wave, or if this is a more general phenomenon.  We find 
consistent support that the reiteration of contested multiparty elections leads to the 
improvement of rule of law and the quality of civil rights protections. 
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Introduction 
There are many different views on what democracy is, or ought to be.  Yet, a common 
institutional denominator for modern democracy is elections.  This is, in part, a consequence of 
the impracticalities of direct democracy in larger polities (Madison 1961/1789: 81-84; Jefferson 
1935: 83; Mill 1958: 212-18).  Elections have become the institutional key to the modern 
actualization of the essence of democracy: rule of the people by the people through 
representative government.  Every modern definition of representative democracy includes 
contested elections as the fundamental legitimate procedure for the translation of rule by the 
people into workable executive and legislative power.  
Now that this is more-or-less universally acknowledged, the post-Cold-War period has 
seen the emergence of authoritarian regimes that imitate democratic procedures without 
embracing their full substance.  This has sparked a very different debate, which at the same time 
is highly consequential in terms of its policy relevance.  Do elections have a causal democratizing 
effect, or do they, on the contrary, stabilize autocratic rule?  In other words, should elections be 
supported as a means of democratization, or does the nearly uniform endorsement of de jure 
multiparty elections provide both the justification and the means for autocrats to cling to power?  
A number of prominent scholars in the discipline have vigorously argued both sides of the 
argument, thus justifying more expansive and comprehensive testing.  
This paper tests the competing arguments at a global as well as regional levels and over 
varying time periods from 1900 to 2012.  We use the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset 
(version 4.3), the most comprehensive dataset on democracy ever produced (Coppedge et al. 
2015b).  We find strong evidence that reiterated multiparty elections brings improvement in the 
democratic qualities of polities both globally and in many regions of the world. In terms of 
variation over time we find that the democratizing effect of elections is a relatively new 
phenomenon.  It becomes salient during the Cold War, but has the strongest effect throughout 
the “third wave of democratization” or 1974 to present.  Our findings also suggest some regional 
discrepancies.  Both sub-Saharan Africa and post-Communist Eurasia show the strongest 
evidence of democratization by elections.  Meanwhile, elections have little or no impact on civil 
liberties and rule of law in Asia.  The results are robust to many alternative specifications 
including variation in sample, dependent variable, and means of estimation.  As a result, they 
provide strong evidence in support of the democratizing effect of elections.  The conclusions 
from this have implications for both policy and future research on democratization.  
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The Ambiguity of the Meaning of Elections for the Study of 
Regimes 
Scholars of democratization have long wrestled with the relationship between elections 
and democracy.  In his triumphal account of the third wave of democracy, Huntington 
proclaims, “Elections, open, free, and fair, are the essence of democracy, the sine qua non.” 
(1991: 9).  Founding elections have often been highlighted as the end point of democratic 
transition, when democratically elected governments replaced authoritarian regimes (O'Donnell 
and Schmitter 1986, Mainwaring 1992, Bogdanor 1990).  Such buoyant electoral optimism has 
been reeled in by calls to avoid engaging in the “fallacy of electoralism,” or the error of 
identifying competitive elections as a sufficient condition for defining democracy (Karl 1990, 
Schmitter and Karl, 1991).  In response, Linz and Stepan remind us that while elections are not 
sufficient for democracy, they are surely necessary to it (1996: 2). Przeworski (1991) adds a 
further caveat, pointing out that from a definitional perspective, the loser matters even more 
than the winner: “Democracies are systems in which parties lose elections.” (10). 
While academics try to make sense of the new order where a majority of states are at 
least minimally democratic, authoritarian leaders beset by new challenges to their authority, have 
come to fear that perhaps democracy is in fact becoming “the only game in town” (Linz and 
Stepan 1996: 8).  Rather than becoming exemplars of this new spirit, autocrats try to rewrite the 
rules of the game.  This new game is but a simulacrum of democracy, in which the kind of 
institutionalized uncertainty highlighted by Przeworski (1991) is subdued or at least caged.  Some 
authoritarian incumbents learn to secure enough compliance from voters with a minimum of 
visible manipulation in order to dupe donors that things are heading in the democratic direction 
(Schedler 2009), while holding onto power with little risk of having to step down.   
For a while the discipline played around with a range of different concepts - hybrid 
regime (Diamond 2002), semi-democracy (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1995), semi-
authoritarianism (Ottaway 2003), or even notions with elusive real-world referents like 
“anocracy” (Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen, and O’Halloran 2006).2 Schedler (2006) and 
Levitsky and Way (2010) resolved the ambiguity inherent in such terms when they argued that 
elections and even competitive elections are definitional components of not only democracies, 
                                                      
2 “Anocracy” is a particularly cringe-worthy neologism.  It is essentially the same word as anarchy with its original 
Greek parts replaced with aftermarket Latin parts.  The word anarchy comes to English via Latin from the Greek 
word anarkhos (rulerless) [an- (without) + arkhos (leader)]. Anocracy attaches that the Greek negative prefix an- on 
the Latin root -cracy (rule, though derived from the original Greek –kratos).  How the absence of rule came to be 
associated with a form a rule is testimony to the powers of contemporary English to carry meaning in an extremely 
flexible fashion.  
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but of newly emergent forms of authoritarianism as well.3  What differentiates competitive 
elections under authoritarianism is that the “playing field” is not level (or at least not as level as 
under democracy) and that loss by the incumbent while not precluded certainly has a lower 
expected probability than under democracy.  This opens up a whole new perspective on regimes 
and regime transitions. Democratic simulation by authoritarian regimes is perhaps not a sign of 
democratization, but a form of adaptation making authoritarianism more durable in an era of 
near-hegemonic democratic enthusiasm. 
 
From Definitional to Causal 
Even though things have become more complicated definitionally, they have also 
become more interesting causally.  If competitive elections are a necessary condition for both 
democracy and competitive authoritarianism, the ramifications of elections for regime outcomes 
become an open and interesting question.  A number of authors have examined what the 
holding of elections means for regime outcomes.  Many analysts posit reasons why authoritarian 
regimes might benefit from holding elections, specifically how they might stabilize authoritarian 
rule.  Schedler (2006) was among the first to point out that the ability to hold elections and reap 
the legitimacy benefits they convey without much risk of relinquishing office is a net gain for 
authoritarian leaders.  Greene (2007) argues that authoritarian one-party developmental states 
stabilize their regimes by using patronage from public resources to hold and win elections 
without resorting to high levels of fraud or repression.  
Others focus less on the direct salutary effects of elections on authoritarian regimes, 
instead looking at how their outcome – elected legislatures – help to produce authoritarian 
stability.  Przeworski and Gandhi (2007), for example, argue that legislatures allow authoritarian 
leaders to make policy concessions to or share rents with potential oppositional elites.4  They 
show that cases with multiple parties have shorter survival horizons, perhaps somewhat 
undermining their claim about elite cooptation by payoffs.  Lust (2009) frames her findings from 
the Middle East in terms of “competitive clientelism,” whereby rulers use elections to award 
legislative seats, which are associated with large benefits, as a means to stabilize the regime.  
Magaloni (2008) also highlights the role that power-sharing plays in authoritarian survival, but 
                                                      
3 Issuing new more or less helpful labels of less-than-democratic systems of rule became a cottage industry for a 
while. Collier and Levitsky (1997) reportedly stopped counting at 550 different when reviewing the literature in the 
1990s.   
4 They base their argument on the notion that there is an optimal level of party institutionalization that will promote 
stability for any type of regime.  
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posited that voting and political parties are important in cementing credible commitments among 
the members of the elite, thus producing more durable authoritarianism.  Along similar lines, 
Blaydes (2010) argues in the context of Egypt, that competitive elections reduce the prospects 
for destabilizing conflicts among key elite constituencies who compete for rents derived from the 
state.  Finally, elections help authoritarian survival by providing information about regime 
popularity and satisfaction with policy outcomes.  Malesky argues that even one-party elections 
provide some usable information to authoritarian incumbents about the popularity of local 
notables and may alert the central leadership to potential weaknesses outside the administrative 
center (2011).  
In sharp contrast to the scholarship highlighting the utility of electoral institutions for 
authoritarian ends, another body of literature continues to support the hypothesis that the 
holding of competitive multiparty elections is dangerous for authoritarian regimes.  One theory 
holds that elections, even if less than fully free and fair, inspire democratic learning and that the 
reiteration of multiparty elections represents a new mode of democratic transition.  This was 
originally termed the “power of elections” (Di Palma 1993: 85) and was raised by Lindberg 
(2006), in his study of the third wave in Africa. Subsequent work corroborates his findings in 
Africa (Lindberg 2009) and, weakly, in a more global sample (Teorell and Hadenius 2009).  Using 
an event history framework, Miller recently showed that competitive elections generally (but not 
necessarily linked to modern competitive authoritarian regimes) are associated with discrete 
transitions to democracy based on a minimal condition binary indicator of democracy (2015).  
However, other works raise doubts about the theory’s transportability, after delivering null 
findings in replications for both Latin America and Postcommunist Europe (McCoy and Hartlyn 
2009, Kaya and Bernhard, 2013).  The validity of the causal mechanism for the Middle East and 
North Africa has also been questioned (Lust-Okar, 2009).  Even the community of Africanists is 
not univocal on whether the multiparty elections of the 1990s have brought enduring democratic 
change.  Bogaards (2013) questions Lindberg’s findings based on a re-evaluation of the original 
evidence, while a recent extension and replication suggests that the original findings should be 
moderated (Morse, 2015).  More generally, the third wave brought an initial burst of optimistic 
scholarship voicing hopes for a “second liberation” (Ayittey 1992,  Hyden and Bratton 1992).  
This soon turned into doubts about whether these transitions represented “real” change 
(Carothers 1997, Josep, 1998).  While scholars like Bratton (1998) argue that Africa has returned 
to neopatrimonial politics, others see a continuation of disorder and destructive politics (Chabal 
and Daloz 1999), no change at all (Akinrinade 1998), political closure (Joseph 1998), semi-
authoritarianism (Carothers 1997), or elections without democracy (van de Walle 2002). 
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The literature on authoritarian regime survival and replacement also presents evidence 
that is somewhat supportive of the idea of democratization by elections.  Brownlee (2009) 
provides a contingent set of global findings, which generally point in the direction of the salutary 
effects of multiparty elections under authoritarianism for long-term democratic outcomes.  His 
models show that while breakdown in both multiparty and other forms of authoritarianism occur 
at similar rates, when the former breakdown, they have a much higher propensity to become 
democratic (Brownlee 2009).  Svolik (2012) shows that ruling authoritarian coalitions have an 
enhanced survival potential if they are effective in controlling the composition of the legislature.  
This is product of how well they can manage elections and their outcomes.  His findings are thus 
consistent with the proposition that dominant/hegemonic multiparty authoritarianism is more 
stable than competitive electoral authoritarianism (190).  Unlike Brownlee (2009), he does not 
trace what happens in terms of regime trajectory after authoritarian breakdown. 
A second set of studies take the debate further by focusing on elections as junctures of 
enhanced threat to authoritarian regimes due to the greater uncertainty that they provoke.  
Howard and Roessler (2006) investigate whether multiparty elections under authoritarian 
conditions can turn into liberalizing junctures.  They find that this is much more likely when the 
opposition unifies to contest elections and following periods of more intensive popular protests 
against authoritarian incumbents.  On a similar note Bunce and Wolchik show that opposition 
tactics and international support were key to democratizing outcomes in the Color Revolutions 
(2010).  Beissinger makes a similar argument but puts greater overt emphasis on tactical 
emulation through a diffusion mechanism (2007).  Looking at the same events, Tucker (2007) 
presents elections, and particularly when there are perceptions of electoral fraud, as focal points 
allowing for the overcoming of collective action problems. Similarly, Schedler (2009) highlights 
the “magic” effects of popular protest on regime change following elections in autocratic 
regimes.  While these studies are more contingent and focus on a smaller number of cases, their 
general thrust is the same – elections are not necessarily the culmination of democratic transition, 
but can be its inception as well. 
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Framing a More Definitive Set of Tests 
Competitive multiparty elections are thus now accepted as a defining characteristic of 
both democracy and competitive authoritarianism.  For a large swath of the discipline this serves 
to address the teleological bias in the problem of never-ending transitions  (Carothers, 2002), 
though this is much more inherent to the policy community rather than academic circles.5   
Much of the research outlined above developed as a product of post-Cold-War politics, a 
period when discredited dictatorial alternatives incorporated multi-party elections into 
authoritarian systems on a scale not seen before.  Previously no-party or one-party states faced 
pressures to open their political systems to political competition, especially those reliant on the 
West for developmental or financial assistance (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997, Dunning 2004).  
Yet, many incumbent authoritarian leaders did not relinquish power but instead tried to manage 
the change.6  
The research that we discuss above has conceptualized these developments in two 
radically different ways.  For Schedler, Gandhi and Przeworski, Levitsky and Way, and those 
who followed them, multiparty elections are an adaptation by authoritarian incumbents facing a 
new a set of global realities.  The successful navigation of the dilemma of allowing opposition to 
contest elections (or the existence of representative institutions within an authoritarian 
framework) led to more robust and adaptable forms of authoritarianism.  For the other set of 
authors, the emergence of multiparty elections in authoritarian states, represents a new mode of 
transition to democracy.  Lindberg (2006, 2009) presents this as a protracted process where there 
is not a founding democratic election that punctuates a radical break between authoritarianism 
and democratic episodes. Reiterated elections lead to a strengthening of core democratic 
elements such as competition and the protection of the civil liberties, both of which are 
necessary to democracy.  For those who theorize about the Color Revolutions, the extrication 
from communism did not result in democracy (though there is some ambiguity about whether 
these are “frozen” or “incomplete” transitions or forms of neo-authoritarianism).  However, the 
continued holding of elections opens up periodic opportunities for the democratic opposition to 
press their grievances vis-à-vis the authoritarian incumbent. 
                                                      
5 It is important to remember that the first signs of this were raised by O’Donnell’s paper on “Delegative 
Democracy” which had circulated in conference paper form in academic circles for a year or two before it 
publication (1994).  It is also useful in this regard to consult O’Donnell (1996) and Schneider (1995).   
6 Initial conceptualizations (Munck and Leff 1997) of this as a top-down mode of transition on the Spanish pattern 
did not last long.   
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In this paper, we assess which of these theories has greater traction.  Specifically we test 
if reiterated multiparty elections lead to an increase in the quality of democracy over time.  
Should we fail to find this it would suggest that they serve to promote an authoritarian status 
quo.  It provides the most comprehensive test to date in terms of temporal and spatial coverage.  
As part of this ambition, we also seek to establish the scope conditions of the relationship 
between repeated multiparty competitive elections and level of democracy both temporally and 
regionally.  Competitive authoritarianism as well as democratization via elections are third wave 
theories.  Thus, we examine if the results hold for the third wave period and test whether this 
relationship can be found in earlier periods.  To check for causal heterogeneity at the regional 
level, we retest the hypothesis within the regions for which there are previous results and beyond 
to see if they hold generally and for different temporal periods.  Furthermore, given the rise and 
fall of the Arab Spring, we test if there is any traction for the theory in the Middle East and 
North African region. 
 
Research Design 
Sample 
We test for the democratizing effect of multiparty elections in 2,032 election cycles in 
156 countries from 1900 to 2012.  We also run regressions on regional samples for Africa, Asia, 
Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and Postcommunist Eurasia, and we 
split samples along different time periods.  Our unit of analysis varies by specification and 
includes both country-election-cycles and country-years for robustness.  The largest model 
(global sample, country-year observations) includes 9,857 country-years. 
Dependent Variable 
The outcome of interest in our case is not transition to or level of democracy per se but 
movement towards democracy.  In order to avoid tautology, we focus on processes of 
liberalization in key dimensions essential to democracy but distinct from elections.  The rationale 
is that political systems already allowing multiparty elections will be differentiable into 
democracies and competitive authoritarian regimes by the degree to which they are strictly 
governed by law and the extent to which the state respects formal civil liberties.  Where the 
playing field is uneven, we would expect incumbents to enforce the law unevenly, explicitly to 
their political advantage, and to disadvantage the opposition by periodically violating their basic 
civil rights. We constructed an index variable combining 18 indicators from the V-Dem data that 
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capture rule of law and civil liberties using point estimates (Coppedge M. , et al., 2015b).  The 
data originates from ratings provided by over 2,500 country experts.  Each country-year is 
typically coded by a minimum of five experts aggregated to country-year ratings by a Bayesian 
latent-variable measurement model described in Pemstein et al. (2015).  Our index is drawn from 
a Bayesian factor analysis model (see Appendix A1 for the variables used to compile this index).  
This scale of liberalization ranges from 0 to 1 and serves as our main dependent variable. Higher 
values on this scale indicate a higher degree of rule of law and greater civil liberties.  
Main Independent Variable 
The independent variable is the number of de jure multiparty elections held -Dem 
variables.  The dataset provides a coding of electoral regimes and their interruptions 
(v2x_elecreg).  It also includes coding for whether the number of parties that participated in each 
election (Coppedge et al., 2015a).7  Each count restarts from zero after a breakdown of the 
electoral regime.  A break in multiparty electoral sequences is triggered either by an interruption 
in electoral regime (v2x_elecreg) or a change from multiparty elections.  Because the V-Dem 
data only includes elections after 1900, we identified and coded all earlier election years using 
historical records.  In total, thirty-seven countries had electoral sequences beginning prior to 
1900, with the oldest beginning in the United States in 1788.  To control for differences in 
system of government, we only count executive elections in those systems where the executive is 
directly elected.  For systems where only the parliament is directly elected, we count elections for 
the legislature only (lower chamber for bicameral parliaments).  For the sample included in our 
main models, the number of successive uninterrupted multiparty elections ranges from 0 to 57.   
Our main hypothesis is that the reiteration of elections leads to increases in the quality of 
democracy.  Countries hold elections at different intervals and one might object that this should 
be accounted for.  For example, the United States and Argentina hold mid-term elections to their 
legislatures and other countries have different term-lengths for executive and legislative office.  
The empirical implications of the theory we are testing, however, is that each additional election 
should produce positive, democratizing effects regardless of this.  If the mechanism in part at 
least, is socialization and experiential learning where opposition parties become better at 
coordination, campaigning, and countering fraud; citizens learn to expect more and better rights 
and therefore become more likely to protest; civil society organizations and other pro-democratic 
bodies learn how to better advocate and challenge the regime.  A greater number of elections 
should each have the same incremental effect and results should show up faster in countries 
                                                      
7 Legislative elections (v2eltype_0) and executive elections (v2eltype_6) for first round elections are included. An 
election counts as multiparty if it scores at or above 2 on the V-Dem variable v2elmulpar_ord.   
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holding elections more frequently.  If the mechanism is in part is through elections providing a 
moment of mobilization and international attention when media, judges, opponents and other 
actors can push the boundaries and thus expand freedoms, the results are again expected with 
each election and should therefore materialize quicker in countries holding more frequent 
elections.  For these reasons, we believe our specification of the main independent variable is 
appropriate without accounting for varying intervals between elections in different countries. 
Yet, it does not make theoretical sense to expect a constant and symmetric effect of each 
incremental election.  For example, the twentieth election in a longstanding democracy should 
not be expected to have the same impact as the second election in a country that just introduced 
competitive multiparty elections.  Or to put it more concretely would we expect the same 
marginal effect from the election of 2014 in Sweden as the election that year in Tunisia?  Given 
that there are likely diminishing returns and that regions have different lengths of experience 
with electoral democracy, we should expect to see differing results in regional studies if we 
model the relationship in a linear fashion.  The reasoning is illustrated in the figure below that 
thinks about what we might reasonably expect from the different democratic experiences of 
Africa (AF), Latin America (LA) and Western Europe (WE). 
 
Figure 1:  Regional Sample and Decreasing Returns 
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We suspect that this issue has contributed to the disparate regional findings produced to 
date.  They have modeled the relationship between reiterated multiparty elections and 
democratic qualities as a linear function.  It is clear why the relationship comes out so strongly in 
Lindberg’s African sample.  Reiterated multiparty competitive elections were finally implemented 
widely in the 1990s and thus there is a strong positive slope because of a modest number of 
elections.  Among the regions encompassed by the third wave, Latin America instituted 
multiparty competitive elections much earlier so the marginal effect of each elections would 
begin to diminish making the probability of significant positive outcome more difficult using 
linear regression.  This may indeed explain why McCoy and Hartlyn (2009) did not find much 
support for elections as an engine of increased democratic quality in Latin America.  And if one 
were to consider Western Europe, where many countries are highly democratic and have been 
for a sustained period of time, diminishing returns would make the function practically flat.   
As a result, the relationship between elections and democratization should be expected to 
be curvilinear.  While early elections will have a large effect on the level of democracy, over time 
this effect should diminish as a democracy is fully actualized and stabilized.  This should be 
expected precisely because countries with higher election counts should have maximized (or 
nearly maximized) their level of democracy.  Countries with a long history of uninterrupted 
multiparty elections should therefore display a smaller or nonexistent effect of an additional 
election compared to countries with lower election counts.  
Thus we model our tests using a diminishing returns assumption by a linear-log function.  
Ten percent of the observations are the first election cycles that technically speaking have a zero 
count of successive multiparty elections.  We therefore add one to each of the zero values (x+1, 
where x=0).  Following advice from Shadden and Zorn (2011), we then include a dummy 
variable to control for election cycles that were originally zeros.  As a robustness check, we also 
include a linear model with and without long-standing, high quality democracies for our global 
tests.  A long-standing democracy is considered any state that survives three uninterrupted 
election cycles at or above a score of 0.75 on the V-Dem polyarchy scale.  Countries that meet 
this criteria drop from the data until they score below 0.75, at which time they reenter until they 
meet the three democratic elections criteria again.  
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Control Variables  
We include four likely confounders as control variables in our models.  We control for 
the level of development using the natural log of per capita GDP (2005 GK$) from the previous 
year.  To measure regime performance, we include per capita GDP growth from the previous 
year.  Both GDP and GDP growth are measured using the estimates by Rosling, Rönnlund, and 
Rosling (2015).  To control for oil rents, we include the previous year’s oil production per capita 
(100,000 metric tons) based on estimates in Wimmer and Min (2006) and Ross (2013).  Finally, 
in all random effects models, we include a control variable for the level of ethnic 
fractionalization as measured by Fearon and Laitin (2003).  We do not include it in the fixed 
effects models because it is time invariant. In some of our robustness checks, we also include a 
time variant measure of ethnic fractionalization, developed from the CREG dataset (Nardulli et 
al. 2102).  This measure, however, only covers the post-WWII period and thus is not included in 
our main models. 
Estimation Techniques 
We estimate cross-sectional time series models with both fixed and random effects.  The 
primary unit of analysis is the country-election-period.  We exclude observations where the 
country is not independent, but include pre-independence elections where they are considered 
integral (as coded in the V-Dem dataset) in the election count-variable.  We estimate models 
predicting the level of protection of civil rights and the rule of law in each election period based 
on the number of elections the country has held, including the current one, and control variables 
from the country-year prior to the election.  For example, for a fixed effects model, the level of 
protection of civil rights and rule of law observed in Uganda for 2006 is regressed on the 
number of successive uninterrupted multiparty elections it had held by the end of 2006 and its 
GDP per capita, GDP growth, and oil rents from 2005.  
The model can be summarized as: !!" = !! + !!"# !!" + !!!" + !!!!"!! + !!!" + !!!" 
where !!"!! are control variables, !!" = !!"!!"!!!"! > 0!!" + 1!!"!!!" = 0 , !!"  is the number of successive 
multiparty elections, and !!" = !0!!"!!!"! > 01!!"!!!" = 0  .8  
                                                      
8 Coefficients in linear-log models can be interpreted as the expected change in level of civil liberties and rule of law 
when the number of elections is multiplied by 2.72 (or the exponential), i.e. increased by 172%.  The impact of other 
percentage changes in the election count can be calculated as: ! ∆! %∆! = !!!(ln !""!%∆!!"" )! 
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We begin by estimating global models using all countries since 1900.  These models 
include year fixed-effects and country-effects, both random and fixed.  Then we run split-sample 
models by historical time period using fixed country-effects.  We are particularly interested in 
how the effect of elections varies during the pre-Cold War, Cold War, and post-Cold War 
periods.  We also address the importance of the third wave of democratization (1974-present) by 
splitting the sample of Cold War years into pre- and post-third wave models.  Finally, to replicate 
and expand previous work in specific regions, we estimate separate fixed effects models for the 
entire time period and the third-wave period for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA), Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC), Asia, and Post-Communist 
countries (PC).  We do not report regional models for long-standing democratic countries 
(includes Western/Southern Europe, North America, New Zealand, and Australia).  Estimations 
suggest that, as anticipated, elections are relatively unimportant for this group of consolidated 
democracies.  They nevertheless are included in the global sample. We also conduct robustness 
tests using models specified with country-years, using the Freedom House civil liberties score as 
the outcome variable, and controlling for time-variant ethnic-fractionalization using the CREG 
dataset (Nardulli et al. 2012).  This allows us to compare our findings to results presented in 
previous studies using this unit of analysis, outcome variable, and control variable. 
 
Results 
Global Sample 
Table 1 presents results for the main models using the full global sample (all regions and 
all time).  We run both fixed (1.1 and 1.2) and random country-effects (1.3 and 1.4).  We present 
models using election periods (1.1 and 1.3) and country-years (1.2 and 1.4) as the unit of analysis.  
These models also control for year fixed-effects.  Generally, the results are similar across 
specifications.  All else being equal, when the number of successive multiparty elections doubles, 
the level of civil liberties and rule of law is expected to increase by 0.01 points (on a scale that 
runs from 0-1).  This suggests that elections have a modest (but robust) impact on the 
democratic qualities of countries holding elections.  
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The control variables largely perform as expected.  The sign on the dummy variable 
controlling for zero multiparty elections (to control for the transformation of the zeroes to ones 
for the logistic transformation as suggested by Shadden and Zorn 2011) is negative, indicating 
that the level of protection of civil liberties and rule of law is lower prior to the holding of the 
first multiparty election.  The log of GDP per capita is positively associated with democratic 
quality, but only for the random effects models.  Oil production per capita, as a proxy for the 
negative association of the resource curse with democracy is negative and significant in election-
cycle models as expected.  Ethnic fractionalization (only for the RE models because the indicator 
in time invariant) is insignificant.  Economic growth is negative, but insignificant.  While this 
would be counterintuitive for regime survival models, we attribute this to the notion that regimes 
under threat of diminished support due to economic contraction, are more likely to use 
repressive measures thus leading to weaker protection of rule of law and civil liberties.   
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As a robustness check of our model specification, we also run linear models with and 
without long-standing democracies.  We model this relationship by rescaling the outcome 
variable to a 0 (low) to 100 (high).  This eases interpretation of coefficients that would otherwise 
be very small. The results reported in Table A2 of the appendix suggest that the linear-log 
specification better models the behavior of the observed relationship without requiring the 
omission of long-standing democracies.  This is evidenced by the fact that the strength of the 
correlation between the number of elections and the civil liberties and rule of law score increases 
when long-standing democracies are omitted from the sample.  However, the key outcome 
variable is only significant for the linear model using random country-effects and fixed year 
effects with long-standing democracies omitted. Given the robustness of the effect of elections 
when using the linear-log estimation and the general theoretical rationale for doing so, it appears 
that the linear model fits poorly.9    
Variation over Time 
The literature suggests, however, that the effect of elections on democratization could be 
temporally bounded, particularly to the post-Cold War or third wave periods.  To test this 
hypothesis, we present split sample models in Table 2.  We estimate fixed effects models for the 
pre-Cold War period from 1900 to 1945 (2.1), the entire Cold War period from 1946 to 1988 
(2.2), the pre-third wave portion of the Cold War from 1946 to 1973 (2.3), the Cold War portion 
of the third wave from 1974 to 1988 (2.4), and the post-Cold War period 1989-2012 (2.5).  We 
do not include year fixed effects for these models due to concerns regarding the increased 
likelihood of biased estimates due to a large number of parameters and a small number of 
observations per country.  Furthermore, substantively, we engage in this split sampling to gauge 
time effects on the basis of periodization. 
The coefficient for elections during the pre-Cold War period is consistent with the full 
model (1.1), but fails to meet conventional levels of statistical significance (p>0.2).  During the 
Cold War, elections have a positive, significant impact that is about 100 percent larger than the 
pre-Cold War period.  However, this effect is primarily driven by the third wave of 
democratization.  All else being equal, during the 14 years that the third wave overlaps with the 
Cold War, every time the number of successive multiparty elections doubled, the expected level 
                                                      
9 Overall, fixed effects models using the linear-log specification also perform better according to AIC and BIC 
scores. The linear-log provides smaller AIC and BIC scores when compared to the linear specification, regardless of 
whether we use election cycle or country year as the unit of analysis.  
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of civil liberties and rule of law increased by about 0.08 on the 0 to 1 index scale.  When we take 
into account the entire third wave period, this effect is reduced by 27%.10    
 
Perhaps a more intuitive way to think about this is in terms of the number of elections, 
all else being equal, it would take for a country to move from one extreme to the other on the 
civil liberties and rule of law scale.  Figure 2 plots the relationship between elections and 
improvements in the outcome variable within distinct historical periods while keeping all other 
covariates constant at their sample mean.  During the pre-Cold-War, the pre-third-wave period 
of the Cold War, and the Cold War as a whole, the effects of repeated multiparty elections are 
more modest.  In none of these samples does the reiterated impact of elections cross .75 on the 
protection of civil of liberties and rule of law. The period of the Cold War prior to the third 
wave rapidly becomes flat.  Meanwhile, the effect has a more modest upward trajectory for the 
pre-Cold War and Cold War period as a whole (which includes the third wave observations from 
1974-1989).  The impact of reiterated elections for part of the third wave that overlaps with the 
Cold War (1974-1989) and post-Cold-War period as a whole shows a much steeper upward 
movement.  These two periods show a much more fulsome liberalization of restrictions on civil 
                                                      
10 Results of this model not reported here. The model for the entire third wave period (1974-2012) using fixed 
country-effects and including all control variables reports ß = 0.08; RSE = .02 for the election count independent 
variable.  
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liberties and rule of law (scoring above 0.75).  During the third wave section of the Cold War, 
this takes about 21 elections.  After the Cold War, this takes only 10 election cycles.  
Figure 2. Predictions Across Historical Periods 
 
The findings are robust when controlling for a time-variant measure of ethnic 
fractionalization, when using country random effects, and when including the Freedom House 
civil liberties score as the outcome variable.  In order to include ethnic fractionalization in our 
fixed-effects models, we compute a time variant fractionalization measure based on Alesina et al. 
(2003) using the CREG dataset (Nardulli et al. 2012).  Similar to Fearon and Laitin’s measure 
which is used for the random effects models, this measure estimates the odds that any two 
randomly selected individuals within a country will be of the same ethnicity.  In Table A3 of the 
Appendix, we replicate our historical sample tests while including this control variable.  Because 
the CREG dataset only covers 1946 to 2012, the ethnic fractionalization score is omitted from 
the pre-1946 sub-sample model.  The results suggest that controlling for ethnic fractionalization 
has little impact on the outcome or the overall findings regarding the effect of elections.  Table 
A4 in the Appendix reports results from historical period models when using random rather than 
fixed country effects.  For these models, we use Fearon and Laitin’s measure of ethnic 
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fractionalization because of its greater coverage years.  These results are also consistent with 
findings when using fixed effects estimation.   
Finally, we test whether the results hold when using Freedom House civil liberties score 
rather than the V-Dem data.  First, we transform the Freedom House civil liberties score into a 
0-1 scale, with higher numbers indicating higher levels of democracy.  This allows for 
comparison between the V-Dem index and the highly popular Freedom House score.  As shown 
in Table A5 of the Appendix, results for the country fixed and random effects models suggests 
that the findings for the third wave period are quite similar when using the Freedom House civil 
liberties score as the outcome.  The only major difference in the findings is that elections are 
only significant at the p<0.10 level when using the fixed effects estimation for the Cold War 
period.    
Regional Variation 
The models above suggest that the onset of the third wave had an important impact on 
how successive uninterrupted sequences of multiparty elections affect the democratic qualities of 
electoral regimes.  In Table 3, we test for whether this finding holds in the key geographic 
regions encompassed by the third wave.  The results reported use fixed effects estimations with 
both the election-cycle and country-year as the unit of analysis.  We report the findings for each 
region using the Freedom House civil liberties scores during the third wave as an alternative 
outcome variable as this was the dependent variable used some of the extant regional studies.11  
The models show that elections have a positive influence on democratization in several, but not 
all, regions affected by the third wave. 
                                                      
11 The Freedom House data begin in 1973, one year prior to the onset of the third wave, so they add the full sample.  
Thus full sample estimations do not lead to any substantive changes and are omitted. 
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For sub-Saharan Africa, the finding is robust for all eight specifications, regardless of 
whether they are election-cycle or country-year, third wave or not.  For the Post-Communist 
states, the results suggest that multiparty elections have a democratizing effect only during the 
third wave.  This contrasts with Latin America, where the full sample is significant at the p<0.05 
level but loses significance (p<0.12) for the third wave for the V-Dem based dependent variable 
using election cycle as the unit of analysis.  The former is interesting in that US foreign policy 
towards authoritarian regimes in Latin America became less supportive beginning in 1976 with 
the Carter administration’s focus on human rights policy.  These results, however, are not robust 
using the Freedom House civil liberties indicator as the outcome variable or when using the 
country-year as the unit of analysis for the V-Dem indicator.  Finally, the evidence from MENA 
and Asia show little to no support for the hypothesis that reiterated multiparty competitive 
elections lead to an improvement in democratic qualities.  When using the election-cycle 
specification, countries in MENA experience increased democracy with more elections, but only 
at the 90% confidence level.  This becomes insignificant in country-year and Freedom House 
models.  In Asia, the election count variable is never significant.    
As a robustness check, we also ran the same models using random rather than fixed 
effects. Table A6 in the Appendix provides the results for these estimations.  Sub-Saharan Africa 
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again stands out has showing the strongest effect of elections on democracy, although the 
election cycle models are only significant at the p<0.10 level.  Results remain mixed for the 
Middle East and Latin America, with significant findings when using the election cycle as the 
unit of analysis and the V-Dem outcome variable.  However, the effect of elections disappears 
for country-year and Freedom House outcome models.  For post-communist Eurasia, the effect 
of elections remains primarily a post-Cold War phenomenon when using the V-Dem outcome 
and is robust regardless of time period for the Freedom House civil liberties score.  Finally, as 
found with fixed effects models, Asian democracy appears unaffected by the number of 
elections.     
With regards to the previous regional findings, we thus provide substantial corroboration 
of Lindberg’s findings for Africa.  Our mixed results for Latin America show significant but not 
conclusive support of the democratization-by-elections hypothesis, so we cannot fully reject 
McCoy and Hartlyn’s findings (2009), and we duplicate their null results using Freedom House.  
The different results using the Freedom House and V-Dem based dependent variable could 
mean that the two measures are tapping into somewhat different dimensions or that the V-Dem 
measures’ precision and methodology that minimizes Western bias in its coding, portrays a more 
trustworthy picture.  We are inclined to believe in both, not the least because Freedom House’s 
ratings for civil liberties are strongly correlated with their ratings for political rights (r=0.93) and 
less so with the V-Dem measure for civil liberties and rule of law (r=0.87). The very robust and 
positive results for the post-Communist region in the post-Cold-War period were not expected 
given the earlier findings of Kaya and Bernhard (2013).  However, their models use very 
different specifications, which take into account such things as voting turnout and strength of 
opposition, which they were using to test a broader range of actor-centered behavior contingent 
theories growing out the literature on the Color Revolutions as well as the democratizing power 
of elections-hypothesis.  However, the fixed effect models that we run here should preferably 
not be overburdened with controls since inclusion of too many variables can lead to hiding real 
effects (Achen 2005, Schrodt 2014).  With the more parsimonious models here, the 
democratizing power of elections-hypothesis is consistently supported by empirical evidence. 
The regional perspective adds further insights on the global findings.  Quite clearly they 
are driven by some regions more than others.  Asia particularly seems less prone to the 
democratizing effect of elections, whereas Africa and postcommunist Eurasia seem to account 
for the bulk of the global effect.  The results for Latin America and the Middle East/North 
Africa fall somewhat ambiguously in the middle. 
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Conclusions 
The wide emergence of new forms of authoritarianism reliant on competitive multiparty 
elections in the period following the Cold War shook up the discipline’s earlier assumptions 
about their role of in defining regime types.  The necessity of relaxing those assumptions to 
make sense of competitive electoral forms of authoritarianism also meant that we needed to 
examine our assumptions about the ways in which countries democratize.  This paper 
investigates whether an increasing number of multiparty competitive elections in uninterrupted 
sequence is associated positively with increased protection of civil liberties and the rule of law in 
a variety of global and regional samples over several different time periods.  Overall, we produce 
substantial and robust findings that this is the case. 
First, we show that this relationship holds over a global sample for the period 1900-2012, 
something only barely hinted at in the previous literature on level of democracy (Teorell and 
Hadenius 2009).  This finding is highly congruent with Miller’s findings on how multiparty 
elections are conducive to democratic transition using an event-history approach with a binary 
indicator, as opposed to our quality of democracy approach (2015).  Second, we show that the 
effect is enhanced in certain time periods.  The effect is clearly strongest during the third wave of 
democratization and in the post-Cold-War period.  What is most interesting is that the adaptive 
behavior of authoritarian incumbents to a historical period of unprecedented democratic 
Zeitgeist was not completely effective in blunting their vulnerability to popular democratic 
challenges (Svolik, 2012).  In their quest to remain in power by simulating democracy, they 
(albeit unintentionally) created a new evolutionary path to democratization through reiterated 
multiparty competitive elections.   
Finally, we shed light on the extant regional findings which created doubt about how far 
the democratization through elections thesis travelled geographically.  We show that the effect is 
most pronounced in Africa and postcommunist Eurasia.  We also turn up less robust evidence of 
similar but much less substantial effects in Latin America as well as the Middle East and North 
Africa.  The only region encompassed by the third wave that we do not turn up evidence for is 
Asia.  The question of why the effect is more prominent in some areas rather than others is a 
compelling question, but one that must be taken up by subsequent research.  All in all we can 
more definitely conclude that democratization through elections is not a case of African 
exceptionalism but a more global phenomenon.  This opens up a range of intriguing new 
questions in untangling and explaining the temporal and regional differences we have uncovered. 
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Appendix 
!
!
! !
Variable(Name Description
v2mecenefm Government,censorship,effort,1,media
v2meharjrn Harrassment,of,journalists
v2meslfcen Media,self1censorship
v2cldiscm Freedom,of,discussion,for,men
v2cldiscw Freedom,of,discussion,for,women
v2clacfree Freedom,of,academic,and,cultural,expression
v2clrspct Rigorous,and,impartial,public,administration
v2cltrnslw Transparent,laws,with,predictable,enforcement
v2clacjstm Access,to,justice,for,men
v2clacjstw Access,to,justice,for,women
v2cltort Freedom,from,torture
v2clkill Freedom,from,political,killings
v2clslavem Freedom,from,forced,labor,for,men
v2clvlavef Freedom,from,forced,labor,for,women
v2clrelig Freedom,of,religion
v2clfmove Freedom,of,foreign,movement
v2clmovem Freedom,of,domestic,movement,for,men
v2clmovew Freedom,of,domestic,movement,for,women
Table(A1.(Variables(Used(for(Civil(Liberties(and(Rule(of(Law(Index
See,Coppedge,et,al,2015b,for,detailed,variable,description.,
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